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ADMISSIBILITY OF FORENSIC DNA PROFILING
EVIDENCE: A MOVEMENT AWAY FROM FRYE v.
UNITED STATES AND A STEP TOWARD THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE:
UNITED STATES v. JAKOBETZ, 955 F.2d 786
(2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 104 (1992)
Since the 1970s, courts have witnessed the widespread introduction
of numerous scientific evidentiary techniques and breakthroughs.'
These procedures provide potentially valuable investigative tools, yet
courts and commentators dispute the foundational requirements for
their admission.2 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) fingerprinting3 is a
1. See, eg., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) (denying admis-
sion of ion microprobic analysis of hairsample); State v. Spencer, 216 N.W.2d 131
(Minn. 1974) (admitting neutron activation analysis for gunpowder particles on hand).
See also ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
(3rd ed. 1986) (discussing scientific evidence as applied in criminal prosecutions).
2. Several law review articles and treatises have examined the debate over the ad-
missibility of novel scientific evidence. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
§ 202-211 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (discussing the admissibility of novel sci-
entific evidence); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVI-
DENCE, % 702[03] (1992) (same); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197
(1980) (examining the Frye general acceptance standard); Michael H. Graham, Evi-
dence and Trial Advocacy Workshop: Relevancy and the Exclusion of Relevant Evi-
dence: Admissibility of Evidence of a Scientific Principle or Technique - Application of
the Frye Test, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 51 (1983) (applying the Frye test to scientific evi-
dence); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for
the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Error as a Cause of
Forensic Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19 (1991) (reviewing the need for close scrutiny
of individual lab protocol on a case-by-case basis); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evi-
dence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879 (1982) (exam-
ining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence); Rules for Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79 (1987) (reporting on proposed rules for admitting novel scien-
tific evidence); William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and
Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45 (1989) (discussing
DNA fingerprinting and the evidentiary standards applied to the technique); Janet C.
Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the
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newly-developed scientific procedure that can identify an individual's
DNA pattern4 and determine whether that person was the source of
blood, hair, tissue, or semen found at a crime scene or on a victim.5
Confronted with the results of DNA analysis, courts have established
Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1990) (examining the unreliability of DNA
typing results in forensic applications).
3. DNA fingerprinting is also referred to as "DNA typing," "DNA profiling,"
"DNA printing," "DNA identification," and "forensic DNA testing." The forensic
application of DNA typing has been hailed as an innovation which could revolutionize
law enforcement. Debra C. Moss, DNA-The New Fingerprints, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1988,
at 66, 66-70 (discussing the use of DNA typing). See also Ranajit Chakraborty & Ken-
neth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work, ScI., Dec. 20, 1991, at 1735
(emphasizing the value of DNA typing as an investigative tool). But see Hoeffel, supra
note 2, at 466-67 (criticizing the reliability of DNA profiling and urging caution in its
admissibility).
4. Each human being has a unique DNA pattern. Hoeffel, supra note 2, at 470.
The forensic DNA techniques identify and "print" the biological specimen. Thompson
& Ford, supra note 2, at 48. A sample of the defendant's blood is typed and compared
to the print obtained from the biological evidence. Id A "match" is declared if the two
prints are visually comparable. Hoeffel, supra note 2, at 474. If a match is declared, the
final step is to assess the statistical probability of the commonness of the DNA profile.
Id.
For a more detailed discussion of the various techniques used to type DNA, see Bu-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS:
ISSUES (1990) (examining the debates inherent in forensic DNA analysis); NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992) (discussing
the techniques utilized in forensic DNA analysis); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS (1990) (examining the fo-
rensic applications of DNA typing); Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 48-52
(discussing the procedures utilized in DNA typing).
5. In addition to its use in the criminal field, scientists also use DNA fingerprinting
extensively in paternity testing. See generally Leon N. Sussman, Paternity Blood Tests,
188 N.Y.L.J. 2 (1982) (discussing the use of DNA typing in paternity disputes); Ronald
J. Richards, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting and Paternity Testing, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 609 (1989) (advocating the use of DNA fingerprinting in paternity cases).
Some state statutes specifically admit DNA evidence to assist in the resolution of
paternity cases. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-108 (Michie 1991) (authorizing the court
to order putative father, mother and child to undergo DNA testing and allowing the
results to be introduced in evidence); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-168 (West Supp.
1992) (same); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.716 (West 1993) (same); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-5-234 (1992) (mandating appointment of expert to conduct any paternity
blood test, including DNA, and clarifying the admissibility of the results); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-11-5(D) (Michie 1992) (creating a presumption of paternity based on results
of DNA tests).
A number of states have also enacted statutes that admit DNA evidence in criminal
cases. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:441.1 (West 1992) (allowing evidence of DNA
results to establish the identity of criminal offenders); MD. CIS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN § 10-915 (Michie 1989) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.25 (West Supp. 1993)
(authorizing admissibility of DNA analysis results in both civil and criminal trials); VA.
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diverse standards and litmus tests for the admission of this type of in-
novative evidence.6 In United States v. Jakobetz,7 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit faced the question of whether to admit forensic
DNA typing results.8 The Jakobetz court adopted a "relevancy" test 9
which admits novel scientific evidence if its probativeness, materiality,
and reliability outweigh its tendency to mislead, prejudice, or confuse
the jury.10
In Jakobetz, the defendant moved to suppress DNA profiling evi-
dence on the ground that such evidence was unreliable and unfairly
prejudicial." Applying the analysis set forth in United States v. Wil-
liams 2 for testing the admissibility of forensic DNA evidence, the dis-
trict court held that the evidence was sufficiently reliable' 3 to warrant
CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.5 (Michie 1992) (allowing evidence of DNA testing to prove the
identity of a person during criminal proceedings).
6. See, eg., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) (employing a
relevancy test); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (adopting a
relevancy test), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishing the general acceptance test); People v. Castro, 545
N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (employing a modified general acceptance standard).
7. 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
8. Id at 789.
9. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the rele-
vancy standard.
10. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 796. To assess the reliability of the scientific evidence, the
court reaffirmed the use of the following factors:
(1) the potential rate of error; (2) the existence and maintenance of standards; (3)
the care and concern with which a scientific technique has been employed, and
whether it appears to lend itself to abuse; (4) the existence of an analogous relation-
ship with other types of scientific techniques and results that are routinely admitted
into evidence; and (5) the presence of "fail-safe" characteristics.
Id. at 794, 796 (citing United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (2d Cir.
1978)).
11. United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 250 (D. Vt. 1990). The defendant
was convicted of kidnapping pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1988). Jakobetz, 955
F.2d at 789. The Federal Bureau of Investigation compared a blood sample from the
defendant with a semen sample from a vaginal swab of the victim and concluded that
the two samples constituted a match. Id.
12. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978). See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text for
a more detailed discussion of the Williams test.
13. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. at 63. The trial judge looked beyond the five Williams
factors for assessing reliability and considered a number of other factors before finding
the evidence admissible. Id. at 254-55. The judge considered: (1) the expert's qualifica-
tions and stature; (2) the existence of specialized literature; (3) the novelty of the tech-
nique and its relationship to more established areas of scientific analysis; (4) whether
experts in the field have generally accepted the technique; (5) the nature and breadth of
1993]
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use in the courtroom and was not unfairly prejudicial to the defend-
ant.14 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed, and held that the Williams test applies to the introduction of
DNA profiling evidence, and that the courts may take judicial notice of
the theories and techniques involved in DNA profiling.' 5 Beyond such
judicial notice, the court noted that the threshold test for admissibility
requires only preliminary proof of the proffered data's reliability. 16
Innovative scientific procedures may potentially assist juries in
resolving factual disputes. 17 Courts hesitate, however, to admit such
techniques because the procedures may be unreliable and overwhelm
the jury."8 To assess the reliability of new scientific processes and eval-
uate their potential for prejudicing the jury, courts have principally
employed two alternative evidentiary standards: the Frye "general ac-
ceptance" standard19 and the "relevancy" standard.2 °
the inference adduced; (6) the clarity with which experts may explain the technique; (7)
the extent to which a court and jury may verify basic data; (8) the availability of other
experts to evaluate the technique; and (9) the probative significance of the evidence. Id.
14. Id. at 263. The court found that the proponent of novel scientific evidence need
not prove the reliability of the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but need only make
a prima facie showing of reliability. Id. at 255.
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence dictates what relevant evidence courts may
omit on grounds of unfair prejudice: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403. The Advi-
sory Committee's Note to Rule 403 defines unfair prejudice as "an undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one." FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
The Jakobetz court recognized the potential for unfair prejudice and stated that thejury may be overwhelmed by the DNA evidence. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. at 262. The
court ultimately concluded that cross-examination, opposing expert witnesses, and jury
limiting instructions counteract the prejudicial hazards of such evidence. Id.
15. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 799.
16. Id. at 799-800.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1970) (noting that
neutron activation analysis may have a substantial impact on the jury), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 994 (1971).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 873, 895 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (de-
nying the admission of psycholinguistics testimony due to its unreliability); People v.
Brown, 709 P.2d 440, 450 (Cal. 1985) (ruling protein gel electrophoresis inadmissible
because of its unreliability). See also supra note 14 for reasons why relevant evidence
may be inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
19. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See infra note 21 for a
discussion of the general acceptance test.
20. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol44/iss1/8
FORENSIC DNA PROFILING EVIDENCE
In Frye v. United States,21 the Circuit Court for the District of Co-
lumbia established the first widely-accepted approach for admitting
novel scientific evidence.2 2 The defendant appealed his conviction2" on
the ground that the trial court erroneously excluded his expert witness'
testimony regarding the results of a polygraph test.24 The court held
that the lie-detector test results were inadmissible and concluded that
courts should admit recently-developed scientific procedures only if
they have been generally accepted in their relevant scientific commu-
nity.2 5 Some courts and commentators have praised Frye's "general
1117 (1979). Under the relevancy standard, novel scientific evidence is admissible if its
probative value is not substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. at 1198. See also FED. R.
EViD. 403, supra note 14 (pronouncing the rule regulating the inadmissibility of un-
fairly prejudicial evidence).
Cases utilizing the relevancy standard include United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463,
466-67 (4th Cir. 1975) (applying relevancy standard to spectrographic analysis), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53-54 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (applying the relevancy approach to voice-print identification); United States v.
Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 511 (D. Md. 1973) (applying the relevancy standard to a
polygraph examination); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 94-95 (E.D. Mich.
1972) (same).
21. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
22. Id. at 1014. The extensively utilized "general acceptance" test articulated in
Frye provides:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimen-
tal and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.
Id. (emphasis added). For a detailed discussion of Frye, see Giannelli, supra note 2 at
1204-28.
23. The defendant was convicted of second degree murder. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
24. Id. The lie-detector test challenged in Frye was a systolic blood pressure decep-
tion test. Id. at 1013.
25. Id. at 1014. See supra note 21 for the court's exact language.
Courts proceeded to adopt the Frye test with little discussion. Gianelli, supra note 2,
at 1206. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding ion
microprobic analysis of hair sample inadmissible under Frye test); United States v. Ad-
dison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding voiceprints inadmissible under Frye);
People v. Slone, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding bite-mark-identifica-
tion test satisfied Frye); Boeche v. State, 37 N.W.2d 593 (Neb. 1949) (holding lie detec-
tor test inadmissible under Frye).
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acceptance" standard for its ability to assess novel scientific evidence,26
while others have criticized the test for its vagueness, 27 its tendency to
exclude potentially useful evidence,2" its inability to guarantee reliabil-
ity,2 9 and its too generalized focus.3°
Recognizing that the Frye standard does not require a case-by-case
26. See United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d at 556 (holding Frye safeguards against
possible prejudicial effects of testimony based upon scientific theories and provides a
high standard which protects the interests of defendants who frequently are unable to
effectively rebut such evidence); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d at 743-44 (lauding
Frye for providing a method by which courts may assess the reliability of novel scientific
evidence).
27. See Giannei, supra note 2, at 1211 (noting that Frye does not specify whether
the scientific technique and/or the underlying scientific principle must be generally ac-
cepted).
Frye's general acceptance standard has come under heavy analytical fire, especially
for its vague mandates and conservative stance toward the admissibility of new scientific
procedures. See, eg., 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE, § 105 (1977) (stating that Frye does not define which scientific field(s) must
find the procedure acceptable, or who is to define the appropriate field(s) into which the
principle falls). But see Philip H. Dixon, Recent Developments, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
875, 881 (1979) (arguing that Frye's vagueness is beneficial and gives the court consider-
able leeway in deciding whether the new scientific technique has achieved general ac-
ceptance in its appropriate scientific field). Some courts have therefore gone further
than Frye and have defined what constitutes "general acceptance." See, e.g., United
States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defining Frye's "general
acceptance" as acceptance by a substantial section of the scientific community); United
States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that Frye's "general
acceptance" has been equated to "scientific nose counting" and is defined as widespread,
prevalent acceptance), rev'd on other grounds, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
28. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 363-64
(1954) (asserting that by requiring a sufficient chronicle history of scientific evidence
before courts deem a technique generally accepted, Frye causes delays in the admissibil-
ity of reliable evidence); Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1223 (noting that under Frye, poten-
tially helpful evidence may be excluded until general scientific consensus develops).
29. See Frederic I. Lederer, Proposals for a Model Rule on Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence: Resolving the Frye Dilemma - A Reliability Approach, 115 F.R.D. 84, 86
(1987) (stating that general acceptance does not guarantee reliability, but only admits
that evidence that is in accord with the "scientific wisdom of the moment"). But see
Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 53 (noting that general acceptance indicates
reliability).
30. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 58 (arguing that focusing narrowly on
acceptance of a specific implementation of DNA fingerprinting would be advantageous).
Critics of the Frye standard further maintain that by focusing attention on the general
acceptance issue, the test obscures critical problems in the use of a specific technique.
Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1226. See also Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 23 (noting that
by focusing on whether a scientific method is generally accepted, courts neglect the
important issue of whether the "analyst complied with proper scientific protocol" in
using the method).
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examination of the particular procedures performed, the New York
Supreme Court in People v. Castro 31 expanded Frye.32 In Castro,33 the
defendant stained his wristwatch with blood.34 The police utilized fo-
rensic DNA analysis to type the blood,35 and the court ordered a pre-
trial hearing to determine the admissibility of the test results.36 The
Castro court found that the scientific community generally accepted
the theory underlying DNA identification and forensic DNA tech-
niques and that these procedures were capable of producing reliable
results. 37 Nevertheless, the court deemed certain DNA results inad-
missible because the testing laboratory failed to use the accepted proto-
col for obtaining reliable results.3 ' The court reasoned that by focusing
attention on the general acceptance issue, the Frye standard overlooked
significant problems in the use of a particular technique. 39 The court
modified the general acceptance test by requiring that before the evi-
dence is admitted, a court must first determine that the specific testing
laboratory adhered to accepted scientific protocol."
The Eighth Circuit followed the Castro decision and applied the
31. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
32. Id at 987-88.
33. The defendant was charged with two counts of second degree murder. Id at
985.
34. Id. The alleged source of the blood was the victim. Id
35. Id. at 985-86.
36. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
37. Id at 999.
38. Id.
39. Id at 987. The court further held that because the DNA typing technique is so
complex, satisfying the Frye test is insufficient to present such evidence to a jury without
a preliminary hearing regarding the particular testing procedures performed in each
case. Id. See also Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 24-33 (emphasizing that the court
must focus on the processes performed in the immediate case); Thompson & Ford,
supra note 2, at 58 (advocating that courts admit DNA evidence only after determining
that correct procedures were implemented in the particular case).
40. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987. The Castro court adopted a three-pronged test to
determine the admissibility of DNA evidence:
(1) Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in the scientific community,
which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable re-
sults?
(2) Are there techniques or experiments that currently exist that are capable of
producing reliable results in DNA identification and which are generally accepted
in the scientific community?
(3) Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted scientific techniques in an-
alyzing the forensic samples in this particular case?
Id.
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modified general acceptance standard in United States v. Two Bulls.41
In Two Bulls, the defendant moved to suppress forensic DNA typing
results.42 The court adopted the Castro standard43 and stated that
both Frye and Federal Rule of Evidence 702" require that the propo-
nent of the evidence, before offering DNA profiling results, must
demonstrate that investigators adhered to proper DNA typing
procedures.45
While some courts follow the "general acceptance" standard and its
progeny, other courts adopt a "relevancy" standard, which is based
upon the Federal Rules of Evidence.46 The Second Circuit employed a
41. 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990).
42. Id. at 57. The defendant was charged with aggravated sexual abuse and sexual
abuse of a minor. Id The DNA profiling technique was performed on a semen stain
from the victim's underwear and was compared to a sample of the defendant's blood.
Id.
43. Id. at 60-61. The court rejected the government's argument that Federal Rule
of Evidence 702's liberal rule of admissibility supersedes Frye's general acceptance stan-
dard. Id. at 59.
44. See infra note 56 for the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
45. Id at 60. By requiring the proponent to lay a foundation prior to the admis-
sion of DNA profiling results, the court believed that any prejudice to the defendant
would be avoided. Id.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 988-90 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding
that expert's footprint identification testimony did not prove so prejudicial as to out-
weigh its reliability); United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 418-20 (3d Cir. 1985)
(remanding case with directions to hold a hearing to determine the reliability and possi-
bility of confusing the jury with the proffered method of eyewitness identification);
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237-41 (3d Cir. 1985) (adopting a standard
that focuses on the reliability of the evidence and then weighs any danger of confusing
or misleading the jury with the testimony of eyewitness identifications); United States v.
Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198-2000 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding evidence of spectrographic
voice analysis admissible due to its reliability and unlikelihood to mislead), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
The Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence do not mention
Frye v. United States when discussing the admission of novel scientific evidence. See
FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note; FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee's
note; FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note; FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory com-
mittee's note; FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note; FED. R. EvID. 703 advi-
sory committee's note.
Courts and commentators have interpreted the absence of a reference to Frye in the
Federal Rules of Evidence in varying ways. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d
348, 352-54 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence encompass Frye
by making general acceptance a factor in determining probative force); See also
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 22 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PRO-
CEDURE § 5168 (1978) (arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 401 neither excludes nor
endorses the general acceptance standard); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol44/iss1/8
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relevancy standard in United States v. Williams.47 In Williams, agents
taped the defendant arranging drug transactions over the telephone
and compared the recordings to taped voice exemplars the defendant
gave after his arrest.48 Investigators utilized a scientific technique
known as spectrographic voice analysis to identify the defendant's
voice on the tape of the drug transactions.49 The court deemed the
scientific evidence admissible because its probativeness, materiality,
and reliability was not outweighed by its tendency to mislead, preju-
dice, or confuse the jury." Furthermore, the court held that, because
the reliability determination cannot rest on a process of "counting sci-
entific noses," a number of specific factors may affect a court's decision
regarding reliability.51 All factors considered, the proffered spectro-
graphic evidence in Williams passed the relevancy standard. 2
More recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a rele-
vancy standard in United States v. Downing.53 In Downing, the defend-
ant sought to introduce expert testimony concerning the reliability of
1237 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding the Federal Rules of Evidence suggests a more flexible
standard for admitting scientific evidence); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 503-04
(Me. 1978) (applying a state evidence rule identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
holding that the rule abrogated the general acceptance standard).
47. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
48. Id. at 1195-96.
49. Id. at 1196.
50. Id. at 1200.
51. Id. at 1198-99. The court outlined a number of factors to be considered in
determining the reliability of a scientific procedure: (1) the potential rate of error; (2)
the existence and maintenance of standards; (3) the care and concern with which a
scientific technique has been employed, and whether it appears to lend itself to abuse;
(4) the existence of an analogous relationship with other types of scientific techniques
and whether their results are routinely admitted into evidence; and (5) the presence of
"fail-safe" characteristics. Id. The court further held that the proffered evidence need
not be infallible, just reliable enough to warrant use in the courtroom. Id. at 1198. The
Williams court implicitly rejected Frye's general acceptance standard by refusing the
scientific nose counting process as a means of assessing reliability. But see Dixon, supra
note 27, at 880-85 (criticizing the Williams relevancy test and defending Frye's standard
as an effective test for evaluating reliability of new scientific procedures).
52. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1201.
53. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). A number of courts have adopted the Downing
relevancy standard. See, eg., United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1985) (ac-
cepting Downing test and admitting physical anthropologist's testimony concerning foot
imprints in the defendant's shoes), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1985); Andrews v. State,
533 So.2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (employing the Downing relevancy test and
admitting forensic DNA testimony).
1993]
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eyewitness identifications.5 4 The Downing court held that the Federal
Rules of Evidence mandate a relevancy approach akin to Rule 403's
balancing test. 5 Furthermore, the court held that Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 70256 requires a court determining the admissibility of novel sci-
entific testimony to focus on (1) the soundness and reliability of the
technique, (2) whether admitting the evidence would overwhelm, con-
fuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the proffered connection between the
scientific results to be presented, and the disputed factual issues in the
case.5 7 Utilizing this test, the court remanded the case to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing concerning the admissibility of the de-
fendant's expert testimony."
United States v. Jakobetz 59 presented the Second Circuit with an op-
portunity to determine which evidentiary standard to apply to prof-
fered forensic DNA profiling results.' ° The Jakobetz court implicitly
rejected the general acceptance standard and concluded that the rele-
vancy approach established in Williams should be applied to the com-
plex technique of forensic DNA profiling. 6' Under the court's
54. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226. The defendant offered expert witness testimony to
rebut the eyewitness testimony identifying him as the perpetrator. Id. The eyewitness
testimony was the basis for the defendant's conviction. Id.
55. Id. The standard the Downing court adopted is designated a "relevancy" ap-
proach because the test explicitly utilizes both Federal Rule of Evidence 401, which
defines relevant evidence as evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any
[material] fact... more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence," FED. R. EvID. 401, and Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which excludes relevant
evidence that may overwhelm the jury. FED. R. EVID. 403.
56. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier-of-fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID.
702.
57. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237. The court held that under Rule 702, an expert's
testimony may be admitted if it will be helpful to the jury in understanding evidence
that is difficult to comprehend. Id at 1229 (citing STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & KEN-
NETH REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 451 (3d ed. 1982)). The
court further held that Rule 702 adopts a liberal stance and favors admissibility by
investing trial courts with broad discretion to admit expert testimony. 753 F.2d at
1229.
58. Id. at 1244.
59. 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
60. Id. at 789.
61. Id. at 796. The court held that the Williams approach embodies the liberal
admission standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Id. See supra note 56 and accom-
panying text for the language of Rule 702.
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analysis, the data obtained from the DNA tests is admissible if the
probativeness, materiality, and reliability of such evidence outweigh
any tendency to mislead, prejudice, or confuse the jury.62
The court determined that any forensic DNA evidence63 should be
admitted absent specific reasons for its exclusion." The court further
held that because the general theories and techniques utilized in foren-
sic DNA fingerprinting are generally accepted, a court could take judi-
cial notice of such information.6" The court concluded that, once a
court takes judicial notice, a court should admit DNA identification
results after there has been a preliminary showing of the reliability of
the particular laboratory procedures performed.66 The court empha-
sized that adherence to laboratory protocol should go to the weight
rather than the admissibility of the evidence.67
The Second Circuit in Jakobetz properly declined to adopt Frye's
general acceptance test and correctly advocated a relevancy standard.
The Federal Rules of Evidence liberally admit any evidence that is
helpful to the trier of fact, relevant to a dispositive issue before the
court, reliable, and not unfairly prejudicial.68 In contrast, the general
62. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 794. The court held that because the probativeness and
materiality of most scientific testimony presented to the jury is not questioned, the rele-
vancy standard primarily entails balancing the reliability of the evidence against its po-
tential negative impact on the jury. Id
63. The court held that any relevant expert testimony, not just that pertaining to
forensic DNA analysis, should be admitted if there is no basis for exclusion. Id. at 797.
64. Id. at 796. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the jury was so
overwhelmed by the highly technical aspects of the DNA typing technique that the
jurors lost their ability to critically analyze the DNA evidence. Id. The court believed
that a jury would not be so swayed as to ignore evidence demonstrating that the lab
failed to adhere to accepted protocol. Id at 797.
65. Id. at 799 (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203
(3d ed. 1984)). The court's choice of Frye's "general acceptance" phraseology to denote
reliability is suspect because the court specifically stated that Frye's general acceptance
standard was abandoned with the adoption of the relevancy test in Williams.
66. 955 F.2d at 799-800. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the gov-
ernment should have to prove the evidence's reliability beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 796. Instead, the court held that after courts take judicial notice of the reliability of
the theories and techniques utilized in forensic DNA identification tests, reliability of
the specific techniques used in the case in controversy need only be preliminarily shown.
Id. at 799-800.
67. Id. at 800. The court's position is in direct conflict with People v. Castro and
United States v. Two Bulls. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of Castro and Two Bulls.
68. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Federal
Rules of Evidence standards for admitting evidence.
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acceptance standard and its overly conservative approach to admitting
evidence has the potential to exclude helpful, relevant, and reliable evi-
dence.69 Rather than adopt the Frye standard and eliminate the jury's
role in assessing the weight of the evidence, the holding of Jakobetz is
consistent with the objectives of the Federal Rules of Evidence by ad-
mitting evidence that could prove helpful to the jury so long as any
tendency to mislead or confuse the jury does not outweigh the proba-
tive value of such evidence.70
Courts across the country admit forensic DNA profiling evidence.71
By examining specific factors, the relevancy standard adequately as-
sesses the reliability of novel scientific techniques such as DNA finger-
printing.72 The Jakobetz decision presents an exhaustive analysis in
support of the relevancy standard. In order to avoid the exclusion of
evidence involving useful scientific procedures that could potentially
solve crimes, more courts should adopt Jakobetzs reasoning and apply
the relevancy standard. Unfortunately, however, the debate over the
merits of the general acceptance and relevancy standards will persist as
long as the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence does
not explicitly address the evidentiary issues the controversy presents.73
If more courts move away from the restrictive Frye standard, and to
the relevancy standard in Jakobetz, there will eventually be a uniform
approach to the admission of novel scientific evidence.
Jason D. Altman*
69. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text addressing the problems of Frye's
evidentiary standard.
70. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text for discussion of other cases that
adopt the relevancy standard.
71. See Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 3, at 1735.
72. See supra note 51 and accompanying text for the specific elements used in the
relevancy test to assess the reliability of new scientific procedures.
73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text for discussion of the effect the Federal
Rules of Evidence have on Frye's general admissibility standard.
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